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We propose a quantum voting system, in the spirit of quantum games such as the quantum
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Our scheme enables a constitution to violate a quantum analog of Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem. Arrow’s Theorem is a claim proved deductively in economics: Every (classi-
cal) constitution endowed with three innocuous-seeming properties is a dictatorship. We construct
quantum analogs of constitutions, of the properties, and of Arrow’s Theorem. A quantum version
of majority rule, we show, violates this Quantum Arrow Conjecture. Our voting system allows
for tactical-voting strategies reliant on entanglement, interference, and superpositions. This con-
tribution to quantum game theory helps elucidate how quantum phenomena can be harnessed for
strategic advantage.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac
Today’s voting systems are classical. Societies hold
elections to determine which of several candidates will
win an office. Each voter ranks the candidates, forming a
preference. Voters’ preferences are combined determinis-
tically according to some rule set, or constitution. What
if citizens could entangle, superpose, and interfere pref-
erences? We formulate a quantum voting system, in the
tradition of quantum games, that highlights the power of
quantum resources.
Quantum game theory has flourished over the past sev-
eral years [1, 2]. In a classical game, players can perform
only local operations and classical communications. Each
player can prepare and measure only systems in his/her
lab. Players can communicate only via classical channels
(e.g., by telephone), if at all.
Examples include the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Suppose
that the police arrest two suspected criminals. The sus-
pects are isolated in separate cells. If neither suspect
confesses, each will receive a lenient sentence (e.g., one
year in jail). If both suspects confess, both will receive
moderate sentences (e.g., two years). If just one suspect
confesses, s/he will receive no sentence. The other sus-
pect will suffer a heavy penalty (e.g., three years). Un-
able to communicate with the other prisoner, each sus-
pect can optimize his/her future by confessing. Both sus-
pects would benefit more if they could agree to remain
silent. The Prisoner’s Dilemma consists of the tension
between (i) the optimal strategy attainable and (ii) the
optimal strategy that the prisoners could attain if they
could communicate.
Quantizing the game diminishes the tension [3]. Eisert
et al. associate each prisoner with a Hilbert space. They
translate each prisoner’s options (to cooperate with the
police and to defect) into basis elements (|C〉 and |D〉).
The game becomes a quantum circuit. Measuring the
prisoners’ joint state determines their penalties. This
quantization alters the landscape of possible outcomes
and strategies.
Similar insights result from quantizing the penny-
flipping game [4], the Monty Hall problem [5, 6], and Con-
rad’s Game of Life [7, 8]. A game elucidates the canon-
ical demonstration of entanglement’s power: Clauser,
Holt, Shimony, and Hauser (CHSH) reformulated Bell’s
Theorem in terms of a protocol cast as “the CHSH
game” [9, 10].
Elections have been cast in game-theoretic terms [11].
Elections therefore merit generalization with quantum
theory. Upshots of quantization, we show, include a vio-
lation of a quantum analog of Arrow’s Impossibility The-
orem, as well as quantum voting strategies.
Arrow’s Theorem is a result derived, in economics,
from deductive logic and definitions [12]. According to
the theorem, every constitution that has three innocuous-
seeming properties (transitivity, unanimity, and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, defined below) is a dic-
tatorship. Arrow’s Theorem is surprisingly deep and has
fundamentally impacted game theory and voting theory
(e.g., [13]). Yet Arrow’s Theorem derives from classical
logic. A quantum version, we find, is false.
Classical constitutions disobey Arrow’s Theorem un-
der certain conditions. For example, Black supplements
Arrow’s three postulates with extra assumptions [14].
The extra assumptions, he argues, are properties as rea-
sonable as Arrow’s for a constitution to have. No consti-
tution, he shows, can satisfy Arrow’s postulates and the
extras while being a nondictatorship. Some sets of votes,
however, prevent constitutions that satisfy Black’s ex-
tra assumptions from satisfying all of Arrow’s postulates.
Probabilistic mixtures of votes, too, evade Arrow’s The-
orem. Suppose that a voter can pledge 40% of his/her
support to candidate Alice, 40% to Bob, and 20% to
Charlie. Such voters can form a constitution not sub-
ject to Arrow’s Theorem. Yet such constitutions do not
satisfy all of Arrow’s postulates [15–17]. We cleave to Ar-
row’s postulates and avoid restricting voters’ preferences.
Rather, we recast Arrow’s scheme in quantum terms.
Like Black’s extra postulates and like probabilistic
votes, alternative classical voting schemes evade Arrow’s
ar
X
iv
:1
50
1.
00
45
8v
3 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
12
 Ju
n 2
01
7
2Theorem. Engaging in range voting, a voter assigns each
candidate a number of points independently of the other
candidates [18, 19]. Whichever candidate receives the
most points wins. Voters behave identically when using
majority judgment [20]. The majority-judgment winner
has the highest median number of points. Under approval
voting, each voter assigns each candidate a thumbs-up
or a thumbs-down [21]. Range voting, majority judg-
ment, and approval voting contrast with ordinal voting.
Ordinal-voting citizens rank candidates. Arrow’s Theo-
rem governs just ordinal voting. Yet a generalization of
Arrow’s Theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite (GS) The-
orem [22, 23], governs majority judgment and approval
voting. (Range voting is not a scheme of the class gov-
erned by the GS Theorem, just as range voting is not
a scheme of the class governed by Arrow’s Theorem.)
Like the GS Theorem, our Quantum Arrow Conjecture
generalizes Arrow’s Theorem. Yet classicality does not
constrain our generalization as it constrains the GS Theo-
rem. Like range voting, majority judgment, and approval
voting, our voting scheme is not precisely ordinal. Yet
ordinal rankings form the basis for our quantum votes’
Hilbert spaces, as discussed below.
In addition to disproving a Quantum Arrow Conjec-
ture, we present four quantum strategic-voting tactics.
How one should vote is not always clear, even to opin-
ionated citizens. You might favor a candidate unlikely
to win, for example. Voting for a more likely candi-
date whose policies you could tolerate can optimize the
election’s outcome. Strategic voting is the submission
of a preference other than one’s opinion, in a competi-
tion amongst three or more candidates [24]. Quantizing
voting unlocks new voting strategies. We exhibit three
tactics reliant on entanglement and one reliant on inter-
ference and superpositions.
Earlier work on quantum voting has focused on pri-
vacy, security, and cryptography [25–27]. These refer-
ences answer questions such as “How can voters and elec-
tion officials hinder cheaters?” In contrast, we draw in-
spiration from game theory.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we intro-
duce our quantum voting system. We define quantum
analogs of properties of classical constitutions. Four of
these properties appear in Arrow’s Theorem, which we
review and quantize. We disprove the conjecture by a
counterexample. The counterexample relies on the quan-
tization of a fifth property available to classical constitu-
tions: majority rule. Finally, we present three strategic-
voting strategies based on entanglement and one strategy
based on interference.
I. QUANTUM VOTING SYSTEM
A voting system involves a society that consists of vot-
ers. Candidates a, b, . . . ,m vie for office. Each voter
ranks the candidates, forming a preference. A preference
is a transitive ordered list. Each candidate is ranked
above, ranked below, or tied with each other candidate:
a > b, a < b, or a = b. A list is transitive if a ≥ b and
b ≥ c, together, imply a ≥ c.
The voters’ preferences form a profile. The profile
serves as input to a constitution during an election.
We focus on elections that feature at least three candi-
dates. The constitution combines the voters’ preferences,
forming society’s preference. Society’s preference implies
which candidate wins.
We quantize this classical election scheme. Our strat-
egy resembles that of Eisert et al. [3]. Their quantum
game consists of a general quantum process: a prepara-
tion procedure, an evolution, and a measurement [28].
So does our quantum voting scheme. We introduce a
Hilbert-space formalism for quantum preferences. Elec-
tions are formulated as quantum circuits [28]. We define
quantum constitutions and five properties that constitu-
tions can have.
A. Hilbert-space formalism for quantum voters
Let S denote a society of voters. The voters are in-
dexed by i = 1, 2, . . . N . We associate with voter i the
ith copy of a Hilbert space H. The space of density op-
erators (unit-trace linear positive-semidefinite operators)
defined on H is denoted by D(H).
Society is associated with a joint quantum state σsoc ∈
D (H⊗N). The joint state encodes all the information
in the voters’ preferences. This information may include
correlations, such as entanglement, between votes. Con-
sider tracing out every subsystem except the ith. The
result is voter i’s quantum preference, ρi := Tr 6=i(σsoc).
We sometimes denote a pure quantum preference by |ρi〉.
The set of all voters’ quantum preferences forms society’s
quantum profile, P := {ρ1, . . . , ρN}.
Processing P must lead to the identification of a win-
ner. More generally, the quantum society must generate
a transitive ordered list of the candidates. We call such a
list a classical preference. Each classical preference cor-
responds to a state in H. For example, c > a = b > d
corresponds to |c>a=b>d〉. We denote by |γ〉 the γth
classical-preference state and by χγi := |γ〉〈γ| the associ-
ated density operator. The set {|γ〉} forms the preference
basis B for H.
Consider any pair (a, b) of candidates. H decom-
poses into subspaces associated with the possible rela-
tionships between a and b. By Ga>b, we denote the
subspace spanned by the B elements that encode a > b
(e.g., |a>b=c〉, |c>a>b〉, etc.). The subspaces Gb>a and
Ga=b are defined analogously. For example, |a>b>c〉 oc-
cupies the intersection of three subspaces: |a>b>c〉 ∈
Ga>b ∩ Ga>c ∩ Gb>c. The a > b, b > a, and a = b sub-
spaces are disjoint. For example, Ga>b ∩Gb>a = ∅. Πa>b
denotes the projector onto the subspace Ga>b. The pro-
jector Πa=b is defined analogously.
Consider measuring projectively a quantum preference
ρi with respect to B. The measurement yields a classi-
3cal preference. If ρi is a nontrivial linear combination or
mixture of B elements, the measurement is probabilistic.
A voter’s ability to superpose classical preferences resem-
bles a prisoner’s ability to superpose classical tactics in
the quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma [3].
During a quantum election, society’s joint state is
transformed into society’s quantum preference: σsoc 7→
ρsoc ∈ D(H). This ρsoc is measured with respect to B.
generating society’s classical preference. The quantum
election can be formulated as a quantum circuit [28]. A
quantum constitution, which we now introduce, imple-
ments the transformation.
B. Quantum constitutions
A classical constitution C is a map from the profile of
the voters’ classical preferences to society’s classical pref-
erence. We define quantum constitutions analogously.
Having completed the definition of quantum elections,
we define their classical limit. The classical constitutions
that obey Arrow’s Theorem have four properties. We
review and quantize these properties.
1. Definition of “quantum constitution”
Quantum constitutions have the form of general
quantum evolutions, as does the Quantum Prisoner’s
Dilemma [3]. A general quantum evolution is a convex-
linear completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP)
map [28]. A map E is convex-linear if, given a proba-
bilistic combination
∑
i piρi of states ρi, E transforms
the component states independently: E (∑i piρi) =∑
i piE(ρi) , wherein pi ≥ 0 ∀i and
∑
i pi = 1 [28]. Every
CPTP map is equivalent to the tensoring on of an an-
cilla, a unitary transformation of the system-and-ancilla
composite, and the tracing out of a subsystem [28].
Each quantum constitution accepts, as input, society’s
joint state, σsoc, and an ancilla. The ancilla is initialized
to a fiducial state |0〉〈0|. When outputted by the con-
stitution, the ancilla holds society’s quantum preference,
ρsoc.
Definition 1 (Quantum constitution). A quantum con-
stitution is a convex-linear CPTP map
E : D
(
H⊗(N+1)
)
→ D(H)
that transforms society’s joint state and an ancilla into
society’s quantum preference:
E(σsoc ⊗ |0〉〈0|) = ρsoc . (1)
Having defined constitutions, we can define the classi-
cal limit.
Definition 2. The classical limit of a quantum election
is the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. Every quantum voter preference ρi is an element of
the preference basis B.
2. The quantum constitution E consists of classical
probabilistic logic gates.
In the classical limit, E can output only elements of B
and probabilistic combinations thereof.
Classical and quantum constitutions can have various
properties. Four properties appear in Arrow’s Theorem.
We review these classical properties, then quantize them.
2. The four constitutional properties in Arrow’s Theorem
and quantum analogs
Arrow’s Theorem features four properties available to
classical constitutions: transitivity, respecting of una-
nimity, respecting of independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives, and being a dictatorship. We review these proper-
ties and define quantum analogs.
Two principles guide the quantization strategy. First,
each quantum definition should preserve the correspond-
ing classical definition’s spirit. Second, each quantum
definition should make sense in the context of entangle-
ment and superpositions—should be able to characterize
a quantum circuit.
A classical constitution C is transitive if every classical
preference in its range is transitive. Suppose that society
prefers candidate a to b and prefers b to c. C outputs a
societal preference in which a ranks above c: a ≥ b and
b ≥ c, together, imply a ≥ c.
Definition 3 (Quantum transitivity). A quantum con-
stitution E respects quantum transitivity if every possible
output ρsoc, upon being measured in the preference basis
B, collapses to a state |a . . .m〉 associated with a transi-
tive classical preference (a . . .m).
Every E obeys quantum transitivity by definition: Given
any input, E outputs a ρsoc that is a linear combination or
a mixture of preference-basis elements. A B measurement
of ρsoc yields a B element. Every B element corresponds
to a transitive classical preference.
Classical unanimity is defined as follows. Let C denote
a classical constitution that respects unanimity. Sup-
pose that every voter ranks a candidate a strictly above
a candidate b: a > b. The constitution outputs a societal
preference in which a ranks strictly above b: a > b.
Definition 4 (Quantum unanimity). A quantum consti-
tution E respects quantum unanimity if it has the follow-
ing two subproperties:
1. Suppose that every voter’s quantum preference has
support on the a > b subspace: Tr
(
Πa>b ρi
)
>
0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N . E outputs a societal quantum
preference ρsoc that has support on that subspace:
Tr
(
Πa>b ρsoc
)
> 0.
42. Suppose that every voter’s quantum preference has
support only on the a > b subspace. E outputs a
societal quantum preference ρsoc that has support
only on that subspace:
supp(ρi) ⊆ Πa>b ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N ⇒
supp(ρsoc) ⊆ Πa>b , (2)
wherein supp(ρ) denotes the support of the quantum
state ρ.
Subproperty 2 might appear extraneous, seeming to
lack a classical counterpart. But classical unanimity sat-
isfies the classical analog of 2 implicitly, as the following
argument shows.
(A) Suppose that every voter’s preference satisfies the
classical analog of having support only on Πa>b:
Every voter prefers a > b strictly.
(B) Society prefers a > b strictly, by the definition of
classical unanimity.
(C) Hence society ranks a and b neither as a = b nor as
b > a.
(D) Hence society’s preference satisfies the classical
analog of having support only on Πa>b.
Definition 4 must contain subproperty 2 explicitly be-
cause the quantum analog of step (B) does not imply the
quantum analog of step (C). Even if ρsoc has support on
Πa>b, ρsoc can have support on Π
a=b : ρsoc can be a
linear combination of elements of Bsoc or can be a mix-
ture. The generality of quantum states necessitates the
articulation of subproperty 2.
Classical independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
is defined as follows. In every classical preference, the
candidates a and b have some relative ranking. Either
a > b, b > a, or a = b. Suppose that society’s relative
ranking of a and b depends only on every voter’s relative
ranking of a and b. Whether society prefers a to b (or
prefers b to a, etc.) depends only on whether each voter
prefers a to b (or prefers b to a, etc.). How any voter ranks
candidate c fails to influence society’s relative ranking of
a and b.
Definition 5 (Quantum independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives). A quantum constitution respects quantum
independence of irrelevant alternatives (QIIA) if whether
ρsoc has support on Ga>b, on Ga<b, and/or on Ga=b de-
pends only on whether each ρi has support on Ga>b, on
Ga<b, and/or on Ga=b.
A classical dictatorship has a dominant voter. Suppose
that society prefers a strictly to b if and only if some voter
i prefers a strictly to b, for all pairs (a, b) of candidates:
∃i : a > b , according to i, ⇔
a > b , according to society, ∀a, b . (3)
The classical constitution C that outputs society’s pref-
erence is a classical dictatorship.
Definition 6 (Quantum dictatorship). A quantum con-
stitution is a quantum dictatorship if there exists a voter
i who has the following two characteristics:
1. Society’s quantum preference has support on the
a > b subspace if and only if voter i’s has:
Tr
(
Πa>bρi
)
> 0 ⇔ Tr (Πa>bρsoc) > 0. (4)
2. Society’s quantum preference has support only on
the a > b subspace if and only if voter i’s has:
supp(ρi) ⊆ Πa>b ⇔ supp(ρsoc) ⊆ Πa>b . (5)
Subproperty 2 plays a role analogous to subproperty 2 in
the definition of “quantum unanimity.”
We have constructed quantum analogs of the four
properties in Arrow’s Theorem. A quantum version of
Arrow’s Theorem, we show, is violated by a quantum
version of majority rule.
C. Majority rule
Majority rule is a fifth property that constitutions can
have. We review classical majority rule, then introduce a
quantum analog. Cyclic voting preferences prevent clas-
sical majority rule from satisfying Arrow’s assumptions.
Quantum majority rule is more robust.
1. Classical majority rule
Let Pcl denote a classical society’s voter profile. Let
C denote a classical constitution that respects majority
rule. C reflects the wishes shared by most voters. Sup-
pose that over half the voters agree on the relative rank-
ing of candidates a and b. C outputs a classical societal
preference that has the same relative ranking of a and b.
A subtlety arises if Pcl involves a cycle. Let T =
{a, b, . . . , k} denote a set of candidates. Suppose that a
and b participate, in Pcl, in pairwise preferences that vi-
olate transitivity. Suppose that every pair of candidates
in T does. T forms a classical cycle.
For example, let Pcl = {(a > b > c), (c > a > b), (b >
c > a)}. A na¨ıve application of majority rule implies
a > b and b > c. Transitivity implies a > c. But a
na¨ıve application of majority rule implies also c > a.
But c > a, combined with the previously derived a > c,
violates transitivity. The constitution may be defined as
outputting a = b = c or as outputting an error message.1
1 One profile can contain multiple cycles. For example, {(a > b >
c), (b > a > c), (a > c > b)} contains a cycle over (a, b) (because
voters 1 and 3 rank a > b, whereas voter 2 ranks b > a) and
a cycle over (b, c) (because voters 1 and 2 rank b > c, whereas
voter 3 ranks c > b).
5Cycles prevent classical majority rule from satisfying
IIA and transitivity simultaneously. Classical majority
rule fails to satisfy Arrow’s assumptions. Hence classi-
cal majority rule cannot contradict Arrow’s Theorem. A
quantum analog of majority rule can.
2. Quantum majority rule
First, we introduce quantum cycles. We then define
the Quantum Majority-Rule (QMR) constitution EQMR.
This constitution, we show, respects quantum transitiv-
ity, quantum unanimity, and QIIA. These properties will
enable EQMR to violate a quantum analog of Arrow’s The-
orem.
Quantum cycles: Let χα1 ⊗ . . .⊗χµN be a product of
preference-basis elements. Suppose that at least two χγi ’s
are pure states labeled by classical preferences that form
a classical cycle. The product will be said to contain a
quantum cycle.
Operation of the Quantum Majority-Rule con-
stitution: EQMR performs the following sequence of
steps. First, EQMR decoheres each quantum preference
ρi with respect to the preference basis:
ρi 7→
∑
γ
|γ〉〈γ|ρi|γ〉〈γ| =
∑
γ
pγi χ
γ
i =: ρ
′
i , (6)
wherein
∑
γ p
γ
i = 1 . Society’s quantum profile evolves as
σsoc 7→ ρ′1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρ′N (7)
=
∑
α,...,µ
(pα1 . . . p
µ
N ) (χ
α
1 ⊗ . . .⊗ χµN ) . (8)
Recall that χα1 denotes the element, labeled by the clas-
sical preference α, of the preference basis B for voter 1’s
Hilbert space H.
EQMR, being a quantum constitution, obeys convex lin-
earity. To specify how EQMR transforms the right-hand
side of Eq. (8), we must specify just how EQMR trans-
forms each factor χα1 ⊗ . . .⊗ χµN .
For each factor, EQMR constructs a directed graph, or
digraph. One vertex is formed for each candidate. The
edges are governed by χα1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ χµN . If more classical
preferences γ correspond to a > b than to b > a, an edge
points from a to b. If exactly as many γ’s correspond to
a > b as to b > a, an edge points from a to b and from b
to a.
EQMR inputs the digraph into Tarjan’s algorithm [29].
Tarjan’s algorithm finds a digraph’s strongly connected
components. A strongly connected component (SCC) is
a subgraph. Every vertex in the subgraph can be ac-
cessed from every other vertex via edges. Every vertex
appears in exactly one SCC. Every SCC in the QMR
graph represents a cycle or a set of interlinked cycles. For
example, let χα1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ χµN = |b>a>c>d〉〈b>a>c>d| ⊗|a>c>b>d〉〈a>c>b>d|. Candidates a and b participate
in a cycle, as do b and c. The a, b, and c vertices form
an SCC. The d vertex forms another SCC. The digraph
appears in Fig. 1.
a b c d
1
FIG. 1: Example digraph formed by the Quantum
Majority Rule (QMR) constitution EQMR: Consider a
society that consists of two voters. Suppose that they
submit the quantum preferences (votes) |b>a>c>d〉 and
|a>c>b>d〉. Voter 1 prefers candidate b strictly to candidate
a, etc. Voter 2 prefers a strictly to c, etc. EQMR maps this
set of preferences to a digraph. Each candidate is associated
with a vertex. The voters’ preferences determine the edges.
For example, most voters prefer candidate a to candidate d.
Hence an edge points from vertex a to vertex d. Exactly as
many voters prefer a to b as prefer b to a. Hence a doubly
directed edge connects a with b. Vertices a and b form one
cycle, while b and c form another. a, b, and c form a
strongly connected component (SCC). So does vertex d.
Tarjan’s algorithm identifies digraphs’ SCCs. EQMR uses
Tarjan’s algorithm to form society’s quantum preference, to
determine who wins the election.
Tarjan’s algorithm returns a list of the SCCs. The later
an SCC appears in the list, the more popular the SCC’s
candidates, roughly speaking. More precisely, let i and
j label SCCs such that i < j. Every vertex in the jth
SCC is preferred to every vertex in the ith. For example,
Tarjan’s algorithm maps Fig. 1 to ({d}, {a, b, c}).
Consider the strict classical preferences in which every
candidate in the jth SCC ranks above every candidate
in the ith SCC, for all j > i. EQMR forms a maximally
mixed state ρ′soc over the corresponding preference-basis
elements. In our example,
ρ′soc =
1
6
(|abcd〉〈abcd|+ |acbd〉〈acbd|+ |bacd〉〈bacd|
+ |bcad〉〈bcad|+ |cabd〉〈cabd|+ |cbad〉〈cbad|) . (9)
EQMR then “gives the minority a shot.” For any candi-
date pair (a, b), suppose that at least one χγi corresponds
to a > b. The constitution spreads an amount δ ∈ (0, 1)
of weight across the a > b subspace:2
ρ′soc 7→ ρ′′soc = (1− δ)ρ′soc + δΠa>b . (10)
This δ serves as a parameter inputted to the constitution.
We omit δ from the notation EQMR for conciseness.
2 “Giving the minority a shot” resembles the action of the United
States electoral college. Whichever candidate receives the most
popular votes usually wins the presidential election. But a can-
didate who receives a minority can win the presidency if favored
by enough of the electoral college.
6Next, EQMR enforces unanimity. Suppose that every
χγi corresponds to a > b, for any candidate pair (a, b):
supp(χγi ) ⊆ Πa>b ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The constitution
projects ρ′′soc onto the a > b subspace:
ρ′′soc 7→ ρ′′′soc = Πa>b ρ′′soc Πa>b . (11)
We have seen how EQMR calculates the ρ′′′soc associated
with each term in Eq. (8). Each (χα1 ⊗. . .⊗χµN ) in Eq. (8)
is replaced with the corresponding ρ′′′soc. This replacement
yields ρsoc. The ρsoc is measured with respect to B. The
measurement yields society’s classical preference.
Three properties of QMR: EQMR has three of the
properties introduced in Sec. I B 2. These properties will
enable EQMR to violate a quantum analog of Arrow’s The-
orem.
Lemma 1. The Quantum Majority-Rule constitution
EQMR respects quantum transitivity, quantum unanimity,
and quantum independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Proof. Every quantum constitution respects quantum
transitivity, as explained below Definition 3. EQMR is a
quantum constitution. Therefore, EQMR respects quan-
tum transitivity.
Quantum unanimity involves two subproperties (see
Definition 4). EQMR respects subproperty 1 due to Tar-
jan’s algorithm and Eq. (9). Suppose that every voter’s
quantum profile has support on the a > b subspace. Most
quantum profiles have support on that subspace. Hence
a appears in the b SCC or in an SCC “preferred to” the
b SCC. Hence ρ′soc contains preference-basis elements as-
sociated with a > b.
Equation (11) ensures that EQMR respects subprop-
erty 2 of quantum unanimity. Suppose that every voter’s
quantum preference has support only on the a > b sub-
space. Every χγi has support only on the a > b subspace.
EQMR projects ρ′′soc onto Ga>b, not onto Gb>a or onto
Ga=b. Therefore, ρ′′′soc has support only on Ga>b.
According to QIIA, whether ρsoc has support on Ga>c
on Gc>a and/or on Ga=c depends only on whether each
voter’s quantum preference, ρi, has support on these
subspaces—not on whether any ρi has support on, e.g.,
Ga>b. To check that EQMR respects QIIA, we must ana-
lyze three cases:
1. a does not participate in a cycle with c.
(a) a participates in a cycle with at least one can-
didate that participates in a cycle with c. For
example, a may participate in a cycle with b,
while b participates in a cycle with c.
(b) a participates in no cycle with any candidate
that participates in a cycle with c.
2. a participates in a cycle with c.
Case 1a requires the most thought. Considering the
example illustrated in Fig. 1 suffices. a does not par-
ticipate in a cycle with c. Yet a participates in a cycle
with b, which participates in a cycle with c. Therefore,
a appears in the same SCC as c. According to Eq. (9),
ρ′soc has support on Gc>a. Yet every quantum voter pref-
erence ρi has support only on Ga>c. How voters rank
b seems to influence how society ranks a relative to c.
EQMR seems to violate QIIA.
Equation (11) rectifies this seeming violation. ρ′′soc is
projected onto the a > c subspace, because every χγi
corresponds to a > c.
But suppose that not every χγi corresponded to a > c.
Suppose that only a majority of χγi ’s did. ρ
′′
soc would
not be projected onto Ga>c. How voters ranked b would
again seem to influence how society ranked a relative to c.
EQMR would again seem to violate QIIA. EQMR would not
because of Eq. (10). Some χγi ’s have support on the c > a
subspace. The “give the minority a shot” step therefore
gives ρ′′soc support on Gc>a. Society’s quantum prefer-
ence would have support on Gc>a regardless of whether
a participated in a cycle with a b that participated in a
cycle with c. How voters rank b therefore does not affect
how society ranks a relative to c.
In case 1b, a does not participate in a cycle with any b
that participates in a cycle with c. Therefore, a appears
in an SCC that “is preferred” to the c SCC. ρ′soc therefore
has support on just the a > c subspace, regardless of any
b’s.
In case 2, a participants in a cycle with c. ρ′soc has
support on the a > c and c > a subspaces, regardless of
any b’s.
Because QMR satisfies the quantum analogs of three
properties in Arrow’s Theorem, QMR can violate a quan-
tum analog of Arrow’s Theorem.
II. ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
Transitivity, unanimity, and IIA have innocent-
sounding definitions. They seem unlikely to buttress au-
thoritarianism. Yet possessing these properties, Arrow
shows, renders a classical constitution a dictatorship [12].
Theorem 1 (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem). Consider
any (classical) constitution used, with ranked voter pref-
erences, to select from amongst at least three candidates.
If the constitution respects transitivity, unanimity, and
independence of irrelevant alternatives, the constitution
is a dictatorship.
Multiple proof exist [12, 30, 31]. Some involve a pivotal
voter v [30, 31]. If v changes his/her mind while all
other preferences remain constant, society’s preference
changes. One proves first that the postulates imply the
existence of a voter slightly weaker than v. This voter,
one then shows, is pivotal and is a dictator. No other
dictator, one concludes, can exist.
We quantize Arrow’s Theorem in the following conjec-
ture.
7Conjecture 1 (Quantum Arrow Conjecture). Every
quantum constitution that respects quantum transitivity,
quantum unanimity, and quantum independence of irrel-
evant alternatives is a quantum dictatorship.
Theorem 2. The Quantum Arrow Conjecture is false.
Proof. We disprove the conjecture by counterexample.
The QMR constitution is combined with a societal joint
state σsoc that encodes a cycle. This combination, we
show, lacks a dictator. We have shown that QMR satis-
fies quantum transitivity, quantum unanimity, and QIIA.
Satisfying the conjecture’s assumptions but not its con-
clusion, QMR and cyclic voting disprove the conjecture.
For simplicity, we focus on strict pairwise preferences.
We consider, e.g., a > b, ignoring a = b. This focus frees
us to drop binary-relation symbols: |abc〉 := |a>b>c〉.
a b c
1
FIG. 2: Digraph representation of the quantum
votes used to disprove the Quantum Arrow
Conjecture: A quantum analog of majority rule, acting on
the quantum votes in Eq. (12), violates a quantum analog of
Arrow’s Theorem. All three candidates—a, b, and c—form
one cycle, as depicted by the pattern of arrows. Cycles
prevent classical majority-rule constitutions from satisfying
all of Arrow’s postulates. Quantum majority rule is more
robust.
Suppose that society’s joint state is a product that
involves a cycle:
σsoc = |abc〉〈abc| ⊗ |cab〉〈cab| ⊗ |bca〉〈bca| . (12)
Decoherence relative to the preference basis preserves the
state. EQMR constructs the digraph in Fig. 2. One edge
points from a to b (because two voters prefer a > b,
whereas one prefers b > a), one edge points from b to
c, and one edge points from c to a. The digraph con-
sists of one SCC. EQMR therefore constructs the linear
combination
ρ′soc ∝ |abc〉〈abc|+ |cab〉〈cab|+ |bca〉〈bca|
+ |cba〉〈cba|+ |bac〉〈bac|+ |acb〉〈acb| . (13)
The “give the minority a shot” step preserves the state:
ρ′′soc = ρ
′
soc . The voters do not unanimously prefer any
candidate to any other: For every voter i, there exists a
voter j such that supp(ρi) and supp(ρj) occupy subspaces
labeled by distinct classical preferences. EQMR therefore
does not project ρ′′soc onto any subspace: ρ
′′′
soc = ρ
′′
soc.
Equation (8) consists of only one term, so ρsoc = ρ
′′′
soc.
Society’s quantum preference appears in Eq. (13).
ρsoc has support on multiple subspaces, e.g., Ga>b and
Gb>a. No quantum voter preference ρi has. No voter
is a quantum dictator, by definition 6. Yet E respects
quantum transitivity, quantum unanimity, and QIIA, by
Lemma 1. EQMR satisfies the assumptions, but violates
the conclusion, of the Quantum Arrow Conjecture. The
conjecture is therefore false.
One can understand as follows why our scheme vi-
olates the Quantum Arrow Conjecture. The successes
of quantum game theory motivate the generalization of
voting to accommodate entangled and superposed pref-
erences. To introduce entanglement and superpositions,
one must formulate an election as a general quantum
process—a preparation procedure, an evolution, and a
measurement. Classical constitutional properties must
be quantized faithfully. The quantum translations en-
able the Quantum Majority-Rule constitution to respect
quantum transitivity and QIIA simultaneously. Classi-
cal majority-rule constitutions cannot respect transitiv-
ity and IIA simultaneously, due to cyclic votes. But QMR
satisfies all the assumptions in the Quantum Arrow Con-
jecture. QMR, with a cyclic voter profile, violates the
conjecture.
Disproofs simpler than ours exist. Ours offers inter-
pretational advantages, however. For instance, let K de-
note a quantum constitution that outputs a superposition
over all inputs. K violates the conjecture. But imposing
K on society—choosing society’s classical preference to-
tally randomly—makes little economic sense. Also, our
disproof elucidates how quantization invalidates Arrow’s
idea. Classical majority rule fails to satisfy Arrow’s pos-
tulates, due to cycles. Quantum Majority Rule is more
resilient. Quantization elevates a classically inadequate
disproof attempt to a quantum disproof.
III. QUANTUM VOTING TACTICS
Imagine that Alice, Bob, and Charlie vie for the presi-
dency of the American Physical Society. Suppose that
Alice and Bob have greater chances of winning than
Charlie has. Suppose that Charlie agrees more with Alice
than with Bob. Charlie’s supporters might vote for Al-
ice. They would be trying to elect a president whom they
neither prefer most nor mind most. Charlie’s support-
ers would be practicing strategic voting. Strategic voting
is the submission of a preference other than one’s opin-
ion, to secure an unobjectionable outcome, in an election
amongst three or more candidates [24].
We introduce quantum strategic voting. Voters lever-
age entanglement, superpositions, and interference. We
present three tactics reliant on entanglement and one
tactic reliant on interference and superpositions. Other
quantum tactics may exist and merit exploration.
To highlight the basic physics, we focus on strict pref-
erences, as in the proof of Theorem 2. For example, we
consider a > b to the exclusion of a = b. We also focus
on pure joint quantum states σsoc.
The strict-preferences assumption lets us compactify
notation. The classical preference a > b > . . . > k > ` >
m has the even permutations m > a > b > . . . > k > `,
8` > m > a > b > . . . > k, etc. These preferences are
labeled α, . . . , µ . Each preference γ corresponds to one
anticycle. We denote the anticycle with a bar: γ¯. For
example, the cycle α := a > b > . . . > m corresponds to
the anticycle α¯ := m > . . . > b > a.
Every pure quantum preference has the form∑
γ
(cγ |γ〉+ cγ¯ |γ¯〉), wherein
∑
γ
(|cγ |2 + |cγ¯ |2) = 1.
(14)
Society’s joint quantum state has the form
|σsoc〉 = (cα1 . . . cαN )|α . . . α〉+ . . .+ (cµ¯1 . . . cµ¯N )|µ¯ . . . µ¯〉.
(15)
A. Three entanglement-dependent voting tactics
Let us simplify our quantum analog of majority rule,
now that QIIA, etc. need not concern us. We introduce
the variation QMR2, labeled E(2)QMR. QMR2 is defined as
follows.
E(2)QMR processes σsoc as in Eqs. (7) and (8). Society’s
joint quantum state σsoc is decohered with respect to the
product of the voters’ B’s. E(2)QMR processes each term in
Eq. (8) as follows. The jth term has the form
(pα1 . . . p
µ
N )j (χ
α
1 ⊗ . . .⊗ χµN )j ≡ pj(χα1 ⊗ . . .⊗ χµN )j .
(16)
The term is labeled by a list Lj = (α, . . . , µ)j of classical
preferences. If most of the preferences are identical—if
most equal γ, say—the jth term in Eq. (8) is associated
with (pj , γ). If no majority favors any γ, E(2)QMR chooses
uniformly randomly from amongst the classical prefer-
ences that appear with the highest frequency in Lj .
E(2)QMR has assembled a list (pj , γj). Society’s classical
preference is selected from amongst the γj ’s according to
the probability distribution {pj}.
Entanglement can help one voter obstruct another.
Imagine that the Supreme Court justices vote via QMR2.
Suppose that Justice Alice wants to diminish Justice
Bob’s influence. However Bob votes, Alice should vote
oppositely. Alice should entangle her quantum preference
with Bob’s. (Given how opinionated Supreme Court jus-
tices are, Bob might not mind broadcasting his quantum
preference.) If Bob votes as in Eq. (14), Alice should
form ∑
γ
(cγ |γ γ¯〉+ cγ¯ |γ¯ γ〉) . (17)
Insofar as γ represents Bob’s preference, Alice votes op-
positely, with γ¯. Even if Bob changes his mind seconds
before everyone votes, Alice need not scramble to alter
her vote.
Entanglement also facilitates party-line voting, if soci-
ety uses QMR2. Suppose that Alice leads the Scientists’
Party, to which Bob and Charlie belong. However Al-
ice votes, Bob and Charlie wish to vote identically. The
voters should form the entangled state∑
γ
(cγ |γ γ γ〉+ cγ¯ |γ¯ γ¯ γ¯〉) , (18)
whose weights Alice chooses. This state generalizes the
GHZ state: If the weights equal each other and only two
candidates run, (18) reduces to 1√
2
(|ααα〉+ |α¯α¯α¯〉).
Finally, entangling voters’ quantum preferences can
pare down society’s possible classical preferences. Sup-
pose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie separately favor α twice
as much as they prefer β. Each voter plans to submit√
2
3 |α〉+
√
1
3 |β〉. Society’s joint state would be
|σsoc〉 =
(
2
3
)3/2
|ααα〉+
(
1
3
)3/2
|βββ〉 (19)
+
2
33/2
(|βαα〉+ |αβα〉+ |ααβ〉)
+
√
2
33/2
(|αββ〉+ |βαβ〉+ |ββα〉).
If the constitution is QMR2, society might adopt α or β
as its classical preference.
Suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie misunderstand
entanglement. Eve can take advantage of their ignorance
to eliminate β from society’s possible classical prefer-
ences. Suppose that Eve convinces the three citizens to
submit the W state
|σ′soc〉 =
1√
3
(|βαα〉+ |αβα〉+ |ααβ〉). (20)
This entangled analog of |σsoc〉, Eve might claim, repre-
sents the voters’ opinion: |σ′soc〉 contains twice as many
α’s as β’s. But QMR2 cannot map |σ′soc〉 to β. Entan-
gled states lead to different possible election outcomes
than product states.
B. Quantum strategic voting via interference
Like entanglement, interference and relative phases fa-
cilitate quantum strategic voting. Consider a society S
whose voters submit pure quantum preferences. Let S
use a variation QMR3, denoted by E(3)QMR, on QMR.
To illustrate QMR3 and the role of interference, we
consider the voter profile
P =
{
|abc〉, 1√
2
(|bac〉+ |acb〉), 1√
2
(|bac〉+ |cba〉)
}
.
(21)
Society’s joint state has the form
|σsoc〉 = 1
2
(|abc〉|bac〉|bac〉+ |abc〉|bac〉|cba〉
+ |abc〉|acb〉|bac〉+ |abc〉|acb〉|cba〉) . (22)
9Similarly to EQMR, E(3)QMR forms a digraph from each
|σsoc〉 term. Each digraph is inputted into Tarjan’s al-
gorithm, which returns a list of the SCCs. Just as EQMR
maps each list to a mixed state ρ′soc, E(3)QMR maps the ith
list to a superposition |ρ(i)soc〉 . Society’s quantum prefer-
ence becomes
|ρsoc〉 ∝
4∑
i=1
|ρ(i)soc〉 . (23)
In our example,
|ρsoc〉 = 1√
6
(|bac〉+ |bac〉+ |abc〉+ |acb〉) (24)
=
√
2
3
|bac〉+ 1√
6
(|abc〉+ |acb〉) . (25)
|ρsoc〉 may vanish: The QMR3 quantum circuit may
fail to output any quantum state. If |ρsoc〉 = 0, society
can hold a revote. (Because QMR3 is defined on just pure
states and does not preserve all inputs’ norms, QMR3
does not satisfy Definition 1. QMR3 can be regarded as
belonging to an extension of quantum constitutions.)
Suppose that voter 3 wishes to eliminate bac from so-
ciety’s possible classical preferences. Eliminating |bac〉
from voter 3’s quantum preference, |ρ3〉, will not suffice.
Voter 3 should introduce a relative phase of −1 into |ρ3〉.
(Alternatively, voter 3 could submit a superposition of
|abc〉 and |acb〉.) Society’s quantum profile becomes
P ′ =
{
|abc〉, 1√
2
(|bac〉+ |acb〉), 1√
2
(−|bac〉+ |cba〉)
}
.
(26)
Tarjan’s algorithm leads to |ρsoc〉 ∝ 12 (−|bac〉 + |bac〉 −
|abc〉 + |acb〉) . Hence |ρsoc〉 = 1√2 (|abc〉 − |acb〉). Keep-
ing the undesired |bac〉 in voter 3’s quantum preference
contradicts our intuitions. Yet interfering the new |ρ3〉
with the other votes eliminates bac from society’s possible
classical preferences.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have quantized elections, in the tradition of quan-
tum game theory. The quantization obviates a quantum
analog of Arrow’s Theorem about the impossibility of
a nondictatorship’s having three simple properties. En-
tanglement, superpositions, and interference expand vot-
ers’ arsenals of manipulation strategies. Whether other
quantum strategies, unavailable to classical voters, ex-
ist merits investigation. So does whether monogamy of
entanglement [32] limits one voter’s influence on others’
quantum preferences. If creating entanglement is difficult
(as in many labs), the resource theory of multipartite en-
tanglement [33] might illuminate how voters can optimize
their influence.
Additionally, other voting schemes could be quantized.
Examples include proportional representation (in which
the percentage of voters who favor Party a dictates the
number of government seats won by Party a) and car-
dinal voting (in which voters grade, rather than rank,
candidates).
Finally, counterstrategies may be formulated. Con-
sider our first entanglement-dependent voting example:
Justice Bob of the Supreme Court prepares his vote. Jus-
tice Alice blocks Bob’s effort using entanglement. How
should Justice Bob parry? Can entanglement assist him?
This problem mirrors quantum-cryptographic problems:
A sender wishes to communicate with a receiver securely.
An eavesdropper attacks. The eavesdropper may ac-
cess quantum or only classical resources, depending on
the problem. How can the sender and receiver parry?
We have illustrated how our “eavesdropper,” Justice Al-
ice, might wield entanglement. How Justice Bob should
counter merits thought.
These opportunities can help illuminate how quantum
theory changes the landscape of possible outcomes and
strategies in games.
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